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WASHINGTON RECEIVERSHIP
RAY GRAVES*
The law of today permits the appointment of many kinds of receivers,
whose powers and duties are infinitely greater than those of the early
"sequestrators" to whom their origin may be traced.1 The law of
receivership developed out of the early Chancery Courts of England.
Historically, a receiver was appointed because of the inability of the
courts to manage properties through the use of injunctive power in
staying waste and like acts. The early receivers were likely titled
"sequestrators," and their primary function was the collection of rents.2
The law of receivership which developed in the courts of Chancery or
equity, and as expanded in those courts, has carried through to and
is inherent in our present day courts with their combined powers of
law and equity.
Though receivership is not an end in itself, and is only ancillary and
in aid of the court's jurisdiction to grant other relief, the right of a
creditor to the appointment of a receiver remains a valuable remedy
used extensively in Washington against corporate debtors. Its use is,
however, often foregone by attorneys either because they are not
familiar with the rules governing receivership or because they are
unaware of the results such proceedings may effect. Similarly, lack of
knowledge in this field often causes attorneys difficulty in dealing with
receivership proceedings instituted by other parties.
The purpose of a corporate receivership is undoubtedly the preserva-
tion of assets for a period during which an orderly liquidation can be
effected and the resulting liquid assets equitably distributed. Such is
also the purpose of corporate bankruptcy. For the individual bankrupt,
the law now has as one of its objectives, relief for the debtor through
discharge of his debts. Such a discharge does not exist in receivership,
nor is it an important aspect of corporate liquidation because the dis-
tribution of assets leaves nothing to proceed against but a corporate
name.
3
* Partner, Murray, Graves & Murray, Tacoma, Wash.
1 1 C.ARx, REcEIvsEas § 4 (3rd ed. 1959).
2 CLARK, op. cit. supra at § 10.
3 RCW 23.01.630 actually provides for dissolution of the corporation thereby even
eliminating the name. No provisions for discharge of noncorporate debtors exist in
our statutes.
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While the number of receivership proceedings is perhaps small in
comparison with the total number of bankruptcy cases, those dealing
with corporate debtors having substantial assets compare favorably
with similar corporate bankruptcies.
Even if the use of receivership could not be justified as a choice
of remedies, its extensive use in this state merits consideration. There
are many situations where receivership would be the preferable device
for liquidation. In the small asset case receivership is speedier because
only a 30 day notice to creditors is required," as contrasted with the
six month period allowed in bankruptcy to file claims. In actual
practice the receiver is likely to be more diligent in uncovering and
liquidating assets to the best creditor advantage because he is paid the
reasonable value of his services rather than an amount based upon an
arbitrary schedule enacted by Congress.6 The receiver may also find
superior court judges more sympathetic than referees in bankruptcy in
allowing expenses for examination of the debtor's books and for the
tracing of assets. The appointment of a receiver can be secured on
application of one creditor and therefore is often easier to secure than
that of a trustee in bankruptcy which requires application by three
creditors to whom is due a certain sum.' These are some of the con-
siderations favoring use of receivership and others will appear ind-
dentally through the article. There are of course many instances where
bankruptcy may be the more effective device for liquidation. Where
the debtor's estate will result from the setting aside of fraudulent and
incomplete transactions, the powers given the trustee favor the use of
bankruptcy.8
A full discussion of the historical development of the law of receiver-
ship, of the powers and duties of the numerous kinds of receivers, and
of the advantages or disadvantages of receivership as contrasted with
bankruptcy and other devices, is beyond the scope of this article. This
discussion is limited to an examination of some of the rules governing
appointment of general liquidating receivers in the State of Washington.
Within that framework we shall examine two facets of the law, viz.,
- WAsH. RPPP 66.04.
511 U.S.C. § 91 (1951).611 U.S.C. § 76 (1956).
7 11 U.S.C. § 95 (1952). Three or more creditors with liquidated claims unsecured
to the extent of $500.00 or over, or one creditor where less than 12 exist may file an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy. Of course the appointment of a receiver is an act
of bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1952).
3 Undoubtedly the trustee's power to deal with fraudulent transactions under § 67
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1952) is greater than that of the state
receiver.
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(a) the sources and general rules of the law of receivership in Wash-
ington, and (b) the procedures to be followed by Washington receivers
in the administration of assets and examination of the areas where
court rules of procedure would aid in such administration. Wherever
Washington law varies from normal receivership patterns those varia-
tions will be discussed.
SOURCES OF WASHINGTON LAW
Grounds for appointment of receivers and application therefor. As
previously noted, our courts have inherent powers to appoint and
regulate or instruct receivers. This inherent equity power is broad,
and, without question, receivers would be appointed and function much
as they now do without the existence of statutory rules and authority.
This is not to say that rules for regulation of receivers are not desirable
or necessary, but, rather, that most present statutes contain grants of
power which were already vested in the courts.
Washington statutes governing the appointment and regulation of
receivers are scattered throughout the code. Those statutes are sup-
plemented by several court rules governing procedure-some of recent
origin. The interpretation of the statutes by the Washington Supreme
Court is worthy of examination because in several instances their
application has been severely restricted.
There are three main provisions in the Washington statutes through
which one may seek the appointment of a receiver, viz., those which
provide for appointment (a) after entry of a money judgment, (b) for
insolvent corporations, and (c) before entry of judgment in a variety
of special situations.
The first general provisions for appointment of receivers appear in
RCW 7.60.020, which sets forth six grounds, any one of which suffice
for the appointment of a receiver. Those six grounds, briefly stated,
are that:
(1) the action is one by a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase;
(2) the action is between joint owners, such as partners;
(3) the property or funds in controversy are in danger of loss or
injury;
(4) the action is a mortgage foreclosure and the property is in
danger of being lost or injured or is of less value than the mortgage and
it is desired to collect rents prior to sale;
1962]
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(5) the allegations are that the defendant is an insolvent corpora-
tion, has dissolved, forfeited its charter, or is in imminent danger of
insolvency;
(6) it may be necessary to secure ample justice to the parties.
Additional authority for appointment of receivers of insolvent
corporations, supplementing RCW 7.60.020(5), is to be found in RCW
23.01.540 and .570.9
One of the most important provisions authorizing appointment of
receivers is to be found in the statutes relating to proceedings supple-
mental to execution. The grant of power to the court is contained in
RCW 6.32.290, which provides:
At any time after making an order requiring the judgment debtor or
any other person to attend and be examined, or the issuing of a warrant,
as prescribed in this chapter, the judge to whom the order or warrant
is returnable, or the court out of which the order was issued, may make
an order appointing a receiver of the property of the judgment
debtor ....
It is important to note that the duties of the receiver under this
statute may cease when he has liquidated sufficient assets to discharge
the judgment preceding his appointment."
Statutes also provide for appointment of receivers as an adjunct of
attachment," under the Cary Act in defaults of contractors in recla-
mation,12 to aid in lien foreclosures 3 and in other special circum-
stances.1
4
9RCW 23.01.540 provides:
"Involuntary dissolution, when authorized. The court may, upon petition being
filed, entertain proceedings for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation when it is
made to appear(1) that the corporate assets are insufficient to pay all just demands for which the
corporation is liable or to afford reasonable security to those who may deal with it;
or (2) that the objects of the corporation have wholly failed, or are entirely
abandoned or their accomplishment is impracticable; or(3) that it is beneficial to the interests of the shareholders that the corporation
should be wound up and dissolved; or
(4) that the number of directors is even and they are equally divided respecting
the management of the corporate affairs, and, when the voting power of all share-
holders is equally divided into two independent ownerships or interests, and one-half
thereof favor the course of part of the directors and one-half thereof favor the
course of the other directors, or the holders of such equal parts of the voting power
are unable to agree on the election of the board of directors consisting of an
uneven number."
10 Pappas v. Taylor, 138 Wash. 22, 244 Pac. 390 (1926).
II RCW 7.12.150.
12RCW 79.48.100.
Is RCW 60.12.100 (crop liens); 6024.130 (timber and lumber) ; 60.32.050 (labor
liens on franchises, etc.)
14 RCW 32.24.070 (mutual savings banks).
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Thus, a variety of situations lend themselves to the appointment of
a receiver. A few practical examples derived from the cited statutes,
are as follows: (1) every creditor who holds an unsatisfied judgment
against a debtor with assets may, in proper proceedings, move for such
appointment; (2) receivers may be appointed after mortgage fore-
closure, during the redemptive period; (3) pending the foreclosure
action in a shifting stock mortgage; (4) in actions between partners a
receiver may be appointed to manage the business or property.
There are, however, some case law limitations on both the statutory
and the inherent power of the court to appoint receivers. First, receiver-
ship is an extraordinary remedy, and a clear necessity should be shown
for its use. 5 Where other remedies are available, receivers are not to
be appointed. 6 Our supreme court has indicated, however, that courts
should more readily exercise their power to appoint receivers for relief
of corporate creditors than in other cases, i.e., the necessity need not
be as clear." When the statutes expand the court's inherent powers
they are in derogation of the common law and are to be strictly
construed. 8
The power of the courts to appoint receivers under, and independent
of, the Washington statutes was the subject of extensive litigation in
the Washington Supreme Court for a period of nearly twenty years-
a subject upon which the court consistently divided, and on which no
clear answers have been presented. In reviewing that case law, par-
ticular attention must be paid to the distinction in cases attempting to
secure receivers for individual, as opposed to corporate, debtors-a
distinction not always found then or now in the statutes or cases.
Under the statutes cited, several alternate methods are provided for
obtaining the appointment of a receiver. Some of those methods are
simple and self-explanatory; others are more complicated. If one pro-
ceeds under the authority of RCW 6.32.290 (formerly RRS § 640),
the moving party must have a judgment, must cause execution to issue,
a indla bona return must be filed, supplemental proceedings must then
issue, and thereafter the receiver may be appointed. In State ex rel.
15 Blinn v. Almira Trading Co., 190 Wash. 156, 66 P.2d 1132 (1937) ; Gahagan v.
Wisner, 139 Wash. 664, 247 Pac. 965 (1926) ; Smith v. Brown, 50 Wash. 240, 96 Pac.
1077 (1908).
16 Norris v. Anderson, 134 Wash. 403, 235 Pac. 966 (1925); Bergman Clay Mfg. Co.
v. Bergman, 73 Wash. 144, 131 Pac. 485 (1913). As a practical matter no other state
remedy exists which insures protection of corporate assets of an insolvent. Further,
under RCW 23.01.540 the existence of other remedies will not defeat the application.
17 State ex rel. Panos v. Superior Court, 188 Wash. 382, 62 P.2d 1098 (1936).18 State ex tel. Dunbar v. Superior Court, 161 Wash. 550, 297 Pac. 774 (1931).
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Panos v. Superior Court1" the supreme court permitted the appointment
of a receiver in a case fitting the pattern of RCW 6.32.290, but did
so under the authority of RCW 7.60.020 (then RRS § 741), rather
than under the first cited statute, and added the further requirements
that the debtor must be insolvent and possess assets. In Kreide v. Inde-
pendence League of America20 the Washington Supreme Court held
that under RCW 7.60.020 (5), when it is shown that a corporation is
insolvent and has assets, the court must appoint a receiver. The con-
tention was there made that since the appellant had a money judgment,
at law he should have proceeded by way of a creditor's bill in equity or
by supplemental proceedings. An interesting side aspect of that case
is the fact that the defendant was a charitable non-profit corporation
and presumably immune from receivership under RCW 24.04.090
until after forfeiture of its franchise.
Earlier, in dealing with the same subject matter in Grays Harbor
Commercial Co. v. Fifer," the Washington court held, without refer-
ence to any statute, that a receiver would only be appointed to take
charge of property when the application shows: (1) a clear right to
the property, some lien on it, or that it constitutes a special fund out of
which the creditor is entitled to have his claim satisfied; and (2) that
possession was obtained by fraud, or that the property or income
therefrom is in danger of loss from neglect, waste, misconduct or in-
solvency. The court also held that until a creditor has first obtained
a judgment at law for his demand against the debtor and return of
execution unsatisfied, an action in equity will not lie to reach assets to
apply them to payment of a demand arising from contract, irrespective
of allegations of insolvency. The case, however, was one involving an
individual debtor, and, although the court made no mention of that, it
was on that specific basis that the last mentioned rule was again fol-
lowed in Blum v. Rowe&2 In State ex rel. Arine v. Superior Court"2 the
court held that Blum v. Rowe, was limited to its facts, and that re-
ceivers could be appointed in other cases before judgment under the
authority of RCW 7.60.020 (6), (formerly RRS § 741), when "it may
be necessary to secure ample justice to the parties'--this latter power
to be used only sparingly, said the court. Again, in Sixpine Leaseholders
19 188 Wash. 382, 62 P.2d 1098 (1936).
20188 Wash. 376, 62 P.2d 1101 (1936).
2197 Wash. 380, 166 Pac. 770 (1917).
2298 Wash. 683, 168 Pac. 781 (1917).
23132 Wash. 258, 231 Pac. 785 (1925).
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v. Seattle Recreation Co.,2" the court held it had no authority to appoint
receivers for individuals until after return of execution on judgment
unsatisfied. In City Mortgage Co. v. Skatveat" the court reaffirmed
the Grays Harbor case, and the Sixpine case, and said that RCW
7.60.020 (6) only applies to insolvent corporations, and not to indi-
viduals. The court made no reference to State ex rel. Arine v. Superior
Court. The statute by its terms is not restricted to corporations, yet it
probably is the law that receivers for individuals may only be appointed
in proceedings supplemental to execution, except in the special instances
provided by RCW 7.60.020 (1) (fraudulent purchase), (2) (action
between partners), and (4) (mortgage foreclosure).
The Washington Supreme Court has said that there are areas where
receivers may not be appointed, mainly because of the existence of other
remedies. Some examples are: (1) divorce proceedings to compel the
parties to liquidate and pay their creditors; 6 (2) actions against cor-
porations based on mistakes, bad policy or inadvertence of corporate
officers if their duties have been honestly pursued; 27 and even in illegal
voting of high corporate salaries; 28 and (3) where garnishment, attach-
ment or execution will enable the creditor to reach the property or
fund.29
The ultimate object of receivership is the preservation of property
for the benefit of persons who have rights therein. Thus, the rules to
be derived from the statute and case law are that any appointment of
a receiver will normally be based upon a showing that (a) there is
property to be preserved or protected, (b) that the property is of a
class subject to receivership, (c) that the applicant is in the class of
persons who have rights in the property, (d) that the applicant has
prayed for and made a prima facie case for other relief, and (e) that
no adequate remedy at law exists. The appointment of every receiver
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, even under the
statutes.30
Temporary and ancillary, or foreign, receivers should be mentioned
at this point. The only statutory authority for the appointment of re-
24171 Wash. 139, 18 P2d 12 (1933).
26176 Wash. 463, 29 P.2d 928 (1934), but see Boyd v. Hutton, 121 Wash. 685, 210
Pac. 33 (1922).2GArneson v. Arneson, 38 Wn.2d 99, 227 P.2d 1016 (1951).2 T Blinn v. Almira Trading Co., 190 Wash. 156, 66 P2d 1132 (1937).2 8 Horejs v. American Plumbing & Steam Supply Co., 161 Wash. 586, 297 Pac.
759 (1931).
20 Grays Harbor Commercial Co. v. Fifer, 188 Wash. 376, 62 P.2d 1101 (1936).
80 Brown v. Mfead, 22 Wn.2d 60, 154 P.2d 283 (1944); Puget Sound Tel. Co. v.
Telechronometer Co., 130 Wash. 468, 227 Pac. 867 (1924).
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ceivers pendente lite in our code is to be found in RCW 23.01.570 (2),
which provides:
(2) The court shall, upon the filing of any such petition, have the
ordinary powers of a court of equity to appoint a receiver or receivers
pendente lite when necessary to the ends of justice, but the authority of
any such temporary receiver or receivers shall cease upon the appoint-
ment and qualification of a liquidating receiver or receivers.
While the application of the statute is restricted to use for insolvent
corporations, the courts have inherent powers to appoint temporary
receivers in other cases and do so frequently, for example, in actions
between partners.
In Washington as in many other states there are no statutory pro-
visions for appointment of ancillary or foreign receivers. Receivers are
officers of the appointing court, and their powers do not extend beyond
the territorial limits of the state of their appointment. Nevertheless, the
courts have long exercised the power to appoint ancillary receivers."
Such procedure might be extremely important in assisting collection
of assets in foreign jurisdictions. The ancillary receiver will, however,
be an officer of the court appointing him, and not an agent of the
primary receiver or of his appointing court. It therefore follows that
proceedings initiated for the appointment of ancillary receivers must
be an adjunct of a cause of action in the ancillary jurisdiction, and the
appointment must be valid under the laws of that jurisdiction. Some
states permit the primary receiver to make the application for his own
appointment as ancillary receiver, but others have residence require-
ments for ancillary receivers.2
Who may be appointed receivers. Very few restrictions appear in our
code as to who may be appointed receivers. The appointment of trust
companies is expressly permitted."3 Appointment of an attorney or
party interested in an action is prohibited," as is the appointment of a
sheriff. 5 However, in the case of the appointment of the interested
party a good argument can be made that where the party is merely one
of several general creditors his interest, no greater than that of other
creditors, is not such as to bar his appointment or that of his attorney.
In any case the appointment may not be collaterally attacked. 6 It is
311 CLARE:, REcEivms, § 317, et. seq., (3rd ed. 1959).
32 d. § 318.
33RCW 30.08.150.
34 RCW 7.60.020(6).35 RCW 7.08.180.36 Pratt v. Anderson, 126 Wash. 30, 216 Pac. 885 (1923).
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doubtful that corporations may be receivers in Washington."7 Where
a receiver has been appointed in one proceeding, the code prohibits the
appointment of an additional receiver."
When and what title a receiver takes. When a receiver is appointed,
the property of the debtor is generally in custodia legis, i.e., it is tech-
nically in the court, rather than in the receiver." Nevertheless, we
generally regard the receiver as being in title. At least one of our
statutes, RCW 6.32.330, specifically provides that title is vested in the
receiver.40
This title of the receiver ordinarily dates from the time of his appoint-
ment," but by special statutes it relates back to the time of service in
supplemental proceedings42 and to the date of application for the ap-
pointment in the recovery of preferences."3
Unlike the trustee in bankruptcy or the common law assignee, the
receiver in many cases stands only in the "shoes" of the insolvent and
has no greater or other power over property than would the insolvent."
The Washington court has held, for example, that a receiver has no
greater rights against a seller of an unfiled conditional sales contract
than the buyer, unless he in fact represents subsequent creditors or such
creditors exist. 5 By contrast, a trustee in bankruptcy acts on behalf of
creditors whether or not they exist and could avoid such a contract and
take possession of the chattel." To that extent the receiver does not
represent or assert the rights of creditors. Yet, entirely inconsistent
with that position, the Washington Supreme Court has held that a
37 1 CLA , REcEIVERS, § 114 (3rd ed. 1959).
38 RCW 6.32.310.
39 2 CLARK, RECEIVERS, §§ 332, 375 (3rd ed. 1959).4o RCW 6.32.330 provides:
"Property vested it receiver. The property of the judgment debtor is vested in a
receiver, who has duly qualified, from the time of filing the order appointing him or
extending his receivership, as the case may be, subject to the following exceptions:
(1) Real property is vested in the receiver only from the time when the order, or a
certified copy thereof, as the case may be, is filed with the auditor of the county where
it is situated;(2) When the judgment debtor, at the time when the order is filed, resides in
another county of the state, his personal property is vested in the receiver only
from the time when a copy of the order, certified by the auditor in whose office it is
recorded, is filed with the auditor of the county where he resides."
41 RCW 6.32.330.
' RCW 6.32.340.
43 RCW 23.01.600.
"4 Roeblings Sons Co. v. Frederickson L. & T. Co., 153 Wash. 580, 280 Pac. 93(1929) ; Western Electric Co. v. Norway Pacific Constr. & Drydock Co., 124 Wash.
49, 213 Pac. 686 (1923).
45 Johnson-Stephens & Skinkle Shoe Co. v. Marlatt & Miller, Inc., 181 Wash. 621,
44 P.2d 818 (1935) ; Bank of California v. Clear Lake Lumber Company, 146 Wash.
543, 264 Pac. 705 (1928).
40 1n re Gunning, 39 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
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receiver is not bound by the executory contracts or leases of the debtor,
partly on the theory that were he bound, the other party to the contract
would be placed in the position of a priority creditor." If the receiver
terminates or breaches such a contract, then the other party may file
his claim for damages and share as other general creditors. However,
the receiver may, and often does, by his acts, ratify or adopt contracts
of the insolvent. 8
The court may, under some circumstances, aid the receiver in taking
possession of property through its summary jurisdiction." Interference
with the receiver's right to possession is contempt of the court appoint-
ing the receiver, and punishable as such."
PowERs AD DUTIES OF THE RECEER
General powers. General powers for receivers are set forth in RCW
7.60.040, which provides:
The receiver shall have power, under control of the court, to bring and
defend actions, to take and keep possession of property, to receive rents,
collect debts, and generally to do such acts respecting the property,
as the court may authorize. (Emphasis added.)
Special powers of receivers for involuntary corporate dissolution
proceedings are to be found in RCW 23.01.580, et seq.1
Rules for procedure and conduct of the receiver are to be found in
a variety of places, but it is the absence, rather than presence, of such
4 7 Casey v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 15 Wash. 450, 48 Pac. 53 (1896); Scott v.
Rainier Power & Ry. Co., 13 Wash. 108, 42 Pac. 531 (1895).48 Fotheringham v. Spokane Savings Bank, 175 Wash. 169, 27 P.2d 139 (1933);
Johnson v. California-Washington Timber Co., 161 Wash. 96, 296 Pac. 159 (1931);
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Oakley, 135 Wash. 275 237 Pac. 990 (1925).
49 2 CLARm, RECEMRS § 632, (3rd ed. 1959) (where offender is a party to the pro-
ceedings).
50 Seymour v. Landon, 128 Wash. 682, 224 Pac. 3 (1924) ; State v. Denham, 30
Wash. 643, 71 Pac. 196 (1903). The receiver's position here is akin to that of the
trustee in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 69 (1938).
51 "Authority of receivers or trustees-Bond. (1) The receiver or receivers
appointed as provided in RCW 23.01.570, shall, after giving such, bond as the court
may require for the faithful performance of his or their duties proceed with the
liquidation of the affairs of the corporation in such manner as the court shall direct.
(2) Trustees or receivers in dissolution proceedings shall have full authority to
compromise, compound and settle claims by or against the corporation upon such
terms as they shall deem best; but if the proceeding is subject to the supervision of
the court, no such compromise, composition or settlement shall be valid unless
approved by the court.
(3) Such trustees or receivers may summon meetings of the shareholders in the
manner the directors might have done, or, if the proceeding is subject to the super-
vision of the court, in such manner as the court may direct."
Except where restricted by statute, general receivers possess the powers historically
acquired, and have the power to instruct receivers under their inherent jurisdiction.
See also, Yakima Finance Corp. v. Thompson, 171 Wash. 309, 17 P2d 908 (1933)
and RCW 7.60.040.
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rules that makes the receiver's task difficult. For the attorney who
seldom handles receivership the problem of guiding the receiver
through the proper steps is a difficult one, because no specific course
of action is outlined in our statutes or rules such as that found in pro-
bate and other proceedings. The extent of the receiver's power and
the areas of his duties should be found in the order appointing him, and
to the extent that the order does not so delineate, the task of the court
and receiver is made more difficult, because as previously indicated
there are numerous kinds of receivers whose duties vary greatly.
Some specific duties of the receiver. The following are some, though
not all, of the requirements governing a receiver: (1) the filing of an
oath and bond; 2 (2) sending notification of his appointment to the
Department of Labor and Industries"2 and (3) notification to the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue; "' (4) filing a copy of the order of his
appointment in the office of the auditor of any county where the insol-
vent may have property;"5 (5) giving of notice to creditors by publi-
cation and mail; 16 (6) giving notice of his application to compromise
claims at less than face value and of any hearing thereon;T (7) selling
property only under court instruction; s (8) examining the corporate
records for unpaid stock subscriptions, unpaid "paid-in capital" and
preferences; 0 (9) preparing an inventory and having the assets of the
receivership appraised;"0 (10) rendering an accounting;" and (11)
setting forth in his petition the amount of any compensation asked for
himself or his attorney and giving notice of hearing thereon.62
Under the Washington case law the receiver has a duty to take
charge of and safely keep and account for all assets of the insolvent
estate, and abide by orders of the court with reference thereto. 3 The
receiver is charged with no greater care over property than such
fiduciaries as the administrator or guardian. 4
52 RCW 7.60.030 (technically, to be sworn).
r3 RCW 51.16.160.
r4 68A Stat. 744, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6036 (1954).
55 RCW 6.32.320.6 0WAs. RPPP 66.04.
57 Id. Rule 98.08.
58 Yakima Finance Corporation v. Thompson, 171 Wash. 309, 17 P.2d 908 (1933);
RCW 7.60.040.6 This duty would arise from the receiver's general duty to use due diligence in
collecting property of the insolvent.
002 CLARi, REcEuv s § 382 (3rd ed. 1959).
61 Id. § 383.
62 VAsH RPPP 98.12.
63 RCW 7.60.040.
04 Johnson v. Pheasant Pickling Co., 174 Wash. 236, 24 P.2d 628, rehearing denied
and amended, 174 Wash. 236, 27 P.2d 587 (1933).
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Claims and the approval or rejection thereof. In proceedings for cor-
porate dissolution subject to the supervision of the court the Revised
Code of Washington applies the national bankruptcy act with respect
to some aspects of approval or rejection of the claim. RCW 23.01.610
provides:
In a proceeding for dissolution subject to the supervision of the court,
all questions in respect to proof, allowance, payment and priority of
claims shall be governed by the national bankruptcy act in force at
the time of the dissolution proceedings.
No statute or rule governs questions of proof, allowance, payment
and priority of claims in other receivership proceedings, with the ex-
ception of the rule fixing the time within which to file creditor's claims
at thirty (30) days, unless extended by order of the court."
Under case law, however, to be provable the claim must be such
that a cause of action exists thereon at the time of the appointment of
the receiver or the amount of the claim must be then capable of
liquidation.6
The receiver has an obligation to resist any improper claims,6 and he
may not allow interest on claims, except those entitled to priority."
Courts have universally held that a creditor's claim may, for good
cause shown, be filed and allowed after the time fixed therefor has
elapsed. 9 It would therefore appear that the limitation fixed or to be
fixed is a procedural, rather than a substantive matter as in probate,
and a proper subject for the rule making power.
The need for Court rules and the Court's power to promulgate rules.
During the past few years our supreme court has promulgated several
rules governing receiverships. Because of the court's inherent powers
to make their own rules in receivership proceedings, it would seem
that little question could be raised respecting the court's power to
adopt rules to be uniformly applied by the lower courts in instructing
receivers. Even were this not so, our courts have a general rule-making
power, under which authority other existing court rules have been
adopted.
65 WAsa. RPPP 66.04.
66 J. E. Berkheimer Mfg. Co. v. American Wood Pipe Co., 178 Wash. 98, 34
P.2d 351 (1929).
67 Thompson v. Huron Lumber Co., 4 Wash. 600, 30 Pac. 741, aff'd, 4 Wash. 600,
31 Pac. 25 (1892).
68 State cx rel. Hansen v. Chelan Co., 185 Wash. 327, 54 P.2d 1006 (1936) ; Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Oakley, 135 Wash. 279, 237 Pac. 990 (1925).
69 Albright v. Sunset Motors, 148 Wash. 348, 268 Pac. 1036 (1928).
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A study should be made into possibilities for adoption of a set of
rules which would, partly because of their accessibility to attorneys,
standardize the practice in receivership. Such rules would enable the
attorney to work in the field of receivership without voluminous read-
ing."0 Adoption of rules would also be of great aid to the trial courts,
who are often equally unfamiliar with such proceedings.
Some suggested areas for adoption of rules are the following:
1. Qualifications for receivers, including residence;
2. Filing of inventories, supplemental inventories and appraisals
thereon;
3. Reporting of creditors and debtors and stockholders of insolvent
corporations;
4. Reports with respect to unpaid stock subscriptions and paid-in
capital;
5. Deposits of receivership funds;
6. Form and contents of creditors' claims;
7. Manner of approving or rejecting creditors' claims, notice to be
given thereof, and persons who may except thereto;
8. Notice requirements in sale of assets;
9. Citation of corporate officers and insolvents;
10. Filing of reports, accounts and contents thereof;
11. Application for authorization of expenditures;
12. Application for adoption of executory contracts.
Rules governing these receivership activities and others are to be
found in the codes of some states and the Chancery Rules of others.'
The Chancery Rules governing receivership in the Delaware courts
would prove a valuable aid in the effort to promulgate rules in
Washington.
CONCLUSION
Although the basic purpose of this article is to discuss problems most
frequently encountered in receivership, it also should point out the
need for the adoption of rules to standardize the practice and procedure
in this area of the law.
70 1 CLARic, RECEIVERS, § 142, (3rd ed. 1959).
7' 13 Dm. CODE ANN. (1933), Rules 148-168.
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Since the law of receivership provides the basis for the exercise of
some of the most valuable rights of creditors in the management of
debtors' estates, it should not be ignored by the practitioner because of
the lack of a readily accessible rule for its use. If the attorney's of the
state are to properly represent creditors, it is essential that both the
bench and the bar exert efforts toward the improvement of the law in
this field by standardization of procedural rules.
